]> Gentwo Git Trees - linux/.git/commit
KVM: x86: Don't emulate task switches when IBT or SHSTK is enabled
authorSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Fri, 19 Sep 2025 22:32:26 +0000 (15:32 -0700)
committerSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tue, 23 Sep 2025 16:15:49 +0000 (09:15 -0700)
commit82c0ec02825814e1ef332d635d3441b07c05b1c9
tree38d78e499942c21e1e6b44336ee1c7f1808a9b7a
parent57c3db7e2e26970ee3630a25913368f849ea803a
KVM: x86: Don't emulate task switches when IBT or SHSTK is enabled

Exit to userspace with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION if the guest triggers
task switch emulation with Indirect Branch Tracking or Shadow Stacks
enabled, as attempting to do the right thing would require non-trivial
effort and complexity, KVM doesn't support emulating CET generally, and
it's extremely unlikely that any guest will do task switches while also
utilizing CET.  Defer taking on the complexity until someone cares enough
to put in the time and effort to add support.

Per the SDM:

  If shadow stack is enabled, then the SSP of the task is located at the
  4 bytes at offset 104 in the 32-bit TSS and is used by the processor to
  establish the SSP when a task switch occurs from a task associated with
  this TSS. Note that the processor does not write the SSP of the task
  initiating the task switch to the TSS of that task, and instead the SSP
  of the previous task is pushed onto the shadow stack of the new task.

Note, per the SDM's pseudocode on TASK SWITCHING, IBT state for the new
privilege level is updated.  To keep things simple, check both S_CET and
U_CET (again, anyone that wants more precise checking can have the honor
of implementing support).

Reported-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/819bd98b-2a60-4107-8e13-41f1e4c706b1@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919223258.1604852-20-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c